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Recognizing Error and Fraud in the Contract of
Marriage in Louisiana
I. INTRODUCTION
As evidenced by the heated debates over the recognition of
same-sex unions,1 as well as by the slew of reality television shows
devoted to the topic, marriage remains a fundamental establishment
in society. While it has been observed that "marriage is a divine
institution, which, when validly contracted, is indissoluble except by
death," 2 allowance must be made for the termination of a marriage
not "validly contracted." Though divorce has become as
commonplace as marriage, 3 less popular remedies, such as
annulment, should be more often considered and utilized. As some
scholars have noted, "there can be little doubt but that annulment,
properly understood and properly applied, is a legitimate and moral
method of ending a marital relationship."'4 In Louisiana, annulments
should be recognized by the law as an available option for spouses
wishing to terminate their marriage under specific instances of error
and fraud.
Though divorce was once more legally advantageous than
annulment, 5 in 1994, the legislature recognized the need to
statutorily provide the same relief to vetitioners in either
proceeding. As in a divorce, both interim and final incidental
Copyright 2006, by Louisiana Law Review.
1. See, e.g., Evan Thomas, The War Over Gay Marriage, Newsweek, July
7, 2003, at 38.
2. James E. Harpster, Grounds for Annulment, 35 Marq. L. Rev. 81, 93
(1951-1952).
3. Michael P. Nichols, The Essentials of Family Therapy 89 (Pearson
Educ., Inc. 2d ed. 2003) (The author states: "One variation of the life cycle that
can no longer be considered a deviation is divorce. With the divorce rate at 50
percent and the rate of re-divorce at 61 percent, divorce now strikes the majority
of American families." (citing R. Kreider & J. Fields, Number, timing, and
duration of marriages and divorces, Current Population Reports, U.S. Census
Bureau (2002))).
4. Harpster, supra note 2, at 82.
5. See, e.g., Note, The Aftereffects of Annulment: Alimony, Property
Division, Provision for Children, 1968 Wash. U. L.Q. 148, 153, n.27. Including
Louisiana among his examples, the author notes, "In the absence of an express
statutory provision, most courts have not allowed permanent alimony following
an annulment." Id.
6. La. Civ. Code arts. 151-52.
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relief---such as final periodic spousal support,9 child custody,' 0 and
child supportll--may be available to the party in an annulment.
12
As such, the prior legal advantages to seeking a divorce, as opposed
to an annulment, have been eliminated.
In addition, an annulment may provide greater emotional
benefits than a divorce. Espousing the emotional advantages of an
annulment for the parties involved, one commentator noted:
The social stigma attached to divorce may constitute a
significant burden to some. Those who dissolve a short but
unpleasant relationship may feel significantly better if the
legal procedure used reinforces their denial that any
significant bond ever existed with the ex-partner. Moreover,
7. La. Civ. Code art. 151 ("Proceeding for declaration of nullity of a
marriage; interim incidental relief') provides: "In a proceeding for declaration
of nullity of a marriage, a court may award a party the incidental relief afforded
in a proceeding for divorce." See also La. Civ. Code art. 105 (noting that
incidental relief entails "a determination of custody, visitation, or support of a
minor child; support for a spouse; injunctive relief; use and occupancy of the
family home or use of community movables or immovables; or use of personal
property.").
8. La. Civ. Code art. 152 ("Proceeding for declaration of nullity of a
marriage; final incidental relief") provides:
After the declaration of nullity of a marriage, a party entitled to the
civil effects of marriage may seek the same relief as may a divorced
spouse. Incidental relief granted pending declaration of nullity to a
party not entitled to the civil effects of a marriage shall terminate upon
the declaration of nullity. Nevertheless, a party not entitled to the civil
effects of marriage may be awarded custody, child support, or
visitation. The award shall not terminate as a result of the declaration
of nullity.
9. La. Civ. Code art. I11.
10. La. Civ. Code art. 152 (quoted supra note 8); La. Civ. Code arts. 131-
37.
11. La. Civ. Code art. 152 (quoted supra note 8); La. Civ. Code art. 141.
12. Distinction must be made between absolutely null and relatively null
marriages to determine the relief available. See La. Civ. Code art. 94
("Absolutely null marriage"), La. Civ. Code art. 95 ("Relatively null marriage;
confirmation"), La. Civ. Code art. 96 ("Civil effects of absolutely null marriage;
putative marriage"), and La. Civ. Code art. 97 ("Civil effects of relatively null
marriage"). See also La. Civ. Code art. 152 cmt. b (noting that while incidental
relief "may be granted irrespective of the nature of the alleged nullity, and of
whether he was in good or bad faith in contracting the marriage," post-judgment
relief "is available only to parties to relatively null marriages and to parties to
absolutely null marriages who are deemed entitled to civil effects as putative
spouses under Civil Code Article 96.").
564 [Vol. 66
COMMENT
although a civil annulment may not satisfy Catholic canon
law, it may be preferable to some Catholics, because it is
theoretically more consistent with the religious remedy than
is divorce.I3
After providing a brief overview of the requisite marital consent
in Part II of this paper, consideration is given to the connection
between annulments and three timely issues in Louisiana: same-sex
marriage, covenant marriage, and divorce. Part HI addresses the
historical background of the marital vices of consent in Louisiana.
Following recognition of the special nature of the marriage contract,
the present elimination of error and fraud from this contract is
established. Particularly, the seminal cases that established the
narrow interpretation of the vices and led to their removal are
discussed. By analyzing the approaches used in the context of
general contract law, as well as the approaches of other states to the
vices of marital consent, Part IV proposes the reintroduction of fraud
and error in Louisiana as sufficient to nullify a marriage contract.
Finally, Part V surmises the positive effects of recognition of the
three vices of consent in the marriage contract in Louisiana. In sum,
the legislature must re-institute the vices of fraud and error as
sufficient to nullify a marriage so as to provide the citizens of
Louisiana with an alternative method for dissolving a
marriage-annulment.
HI. MARRIAGE AND ANNULMENT IN LOUISIANA
To fully understand the shortcomings of Louisiana's approach to
marriage annulments, consideration must be made of the
discrepancies inherent in the state's present article on marital vices
of consent. The approaches used by other jurisdictions, as well as
Louisiana's stance on several contemporary social issues, are at
variance with the state's limited recognition of the marital vices of
consent.
A. The Importance of "Free Consent" in a Marriage Contract
13. Note, supra note 5, at 163.
20061 565
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In establishing a "validly contracted" marriage, free consent is
an essential requirement. Presently, Louisiana Civil Code article 87
requires that the contract of marriage include the "free consent of the
parties to take each other as husband and wife, expressed at the
ceremony."' 14  By including this as one of only three mandatory
elements in all marriages, the state indicates the great importance
that it places upon consent.'
5
Nevertheless, this crucial "free consent" is susceptible of
vitiation. Within the context of general contract laws, three classic,
consensual vices-error, fraud, and duress---are explicitly
recognized. 16 In the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, each of these
vices was also expressly recognized as applicable to the contract of
marriage. 17 Presently, however, only duress is enumerated in the
Civil Code as a vice of consent sufficient to vitiate a marriage
contract. 18 Notably, the Louisiana Legislature's elimination of error
and fraud did not operate to align our state's policy with that of our
sister states' policies; instead, nearly every other state recognizes at
least two of the three vices explicitly and, in some instances, a
variance of the third. 19 Neither did this action conform our law to
that of other civil law jurisdictions, as nearly every civilian
jurisdiction expressly enumerates at least two of the three vices in its
14. La. Civ. Code art. 87.
15. La. Civ. Code art. 87 provides, in full:
The requirements for the contract of marriage are:
The absence of legal impediment.
A marriage ceremony.
The free consent of the parties to take each other as husband and wife,
expressed at the ceremony.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 1948.
17. La. Civ. Code art. 91 (1870) provided:
No marriage is valid to which the parties have not freely consented.
Consent is not free:
1. When given to a ravisher, unless it has been given by the party
ravished, after she has been restored to the enjoyment of liberty;
2. When it is extorted by violence;
3. When there is a mistake respecting the person, whom one of the
parties intended to marry.
18. La. Civ. Code art. 93 ("Vices of consent") provides: "Consent is not
free when given under duress or when given by a person incapable of
discernment."
19. See infra Appendix: State Chart of Marital Vices; see also Franklin G.
Fessenden, Nullity of Marriage, 13 Harv. L. Rev. 110, 113 (1899-1900)
(indicating that the causes for voidable marriages "well recognized by law" then
included "want of consent, including mistake as to persons, duress, and fraud").
566 [Vol. 66
2006] COMMENT 567
codal articles.20 Is Louisiana on the cutting-edge, or is it frustrating
the availability of annulments for its citizens? This author believes
it is the latter.
20. See, e.g., C6digo Civil [C6d. Civ.] art. 175 (Arg.) (J.R. Trahan trans.):
Violence, fraud, and error regarding the person of the other
contracting party vitiate consent. So also does error regarding the
personal qualities of the other contracting party, if it is proved that he
who made the error would not have consented to the marriage if he had
known the state of things and had reasonably appreciated the union that
he was contracting. The judge will evaluate the essentiality of the error
considering the personal conditions and circumstances of him who
alleges it.
Codice Civile [C.C.] art. 122 (Italy), quoted in The Italian Civil Code and
Complementary Legislation 22-23 (Mario Beltramo, Giovanni E. Longo, &
John H. Merryman trans.) (1969):
A marriage can be attacked by that spouse whose consent was
extorted by duress or was caused by a fear of exceptional gravity
deriving from causes external to the future spouse. A marriage can also
be attacked by that spouse whose consent was given as a result of a
mistake on the identity of the person or of an essential mistake
concerning personal qualities of the other spouse. A mistake
concerning personal qualities is essential when, having regard to the
condition of the other spouse, it is determined that the latter would not
have given his consent if he had known them exactly and provided the
mistake relates to:
1) the existence of a physical or psychic illness or of a sexual anomaly
or deviation such as can prevent the development of marital life;
2) the existence of a verdict of conviction for a non culpable crime
with a sentence to imprisonment for not less than five years except in
case rehabilitation has been granted before the celebration of marriage.
The action for annulment cannot be brought until the verdict has
become final;
3) a declaration of habitual or professional delinquency;
4) the fact that the other spouse was convicted for crimes concerning
prostitution to a sentence of not less than two years. The action for
annulment cannot be brought until the conviction has become
irrevocable;
5) a state of pregnancy caused by a person other than the subject who
was affected by the mistake provided that a disclaimer of paternity
pursuant to Article 223 occurred, if the pregnancy was brought to
conclusion.
The action cannot be brought if there was cohabitation for one year
after cessation of the duress or of the causes that resulted in the fear or
after the discovery of the mistake.
C6digo Civil [C6d. Civ.] art. 73 (Spain), quoted in Civil Code of Spain 33 (Julio
Romanach trans. (1994)).
The following are null regardless of the manner in which they are
contracted:
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B. The Effects of Annulment on Louisiana's Marriage Policy
Louisiana's present exclusion of fraud and error as vices
sufficient to annul a marriage contract is at odds with several state
policies.
1. Same-Sex Marriage: Eliminating the Possibility of Valid
Transsexual Unions
First, as the recently successful amendment to the state
constitution reveals, Louisiana is determined to ensure that same-
sex unions will not be recognized as matrimonial relations.
However, in our technologically and medically advanced society,
sex change operations are possible and more prevalent than the
average citizen may realize. Unions involving transsexuals may
not seem like "traditional" same-sex marriages, but several courts
have classified them as such, thereby foreclosing their legal
recognition. 23  However, because the issue remains open in
4. A marriage contracted in error concerning the identity of the other
contracting party, or in error as to those personal qualities that, because
of their importance, were determining factors in the giving of consent.
5. A marriage contracted under coercion or great fear.
21. See, e.g., Will Sentell, Voters OK Constitutional Ban on Same-sex
Marriage, The Advocate (Baton Rouge), Sept. 19, 2004, at LA; Ed Anderson,
Same-sex Marriage Ban is Nullified, The Times Picayune, Oct. 6, 2004 at 1,
available at http://www.nola.com/search/index.ssf?/base/library-57/109704
5859491 10.xml?nola; The Associated Press, La. Reinstates Marriage Ban, CBS
News.com, Jan. 19, 2005, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/
11/02/national/main653118.shtml.
22. Lynn Conway, Vaginoplasty: Male to Female Sex Reassignment
Surgery, Oct. 14, 2005, http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/conway/TS/SRS.html;
Lynn Conway, How Frequently Does Transsexualism Occur?, Dec. 17, 2002,
http:llai.eecs.umich.edulpeople/conwaylTS/TSprevalence.html (in the 1960s,
there were approximately 1,000 operations performed; in the 1970s, 6,000 to
7,000 were performed; in the 1980s, 9,000 to 12,000; and, in the 1990s, 14,000
to 20,000 were performed); Jerold Taitz, Judicial Determination of the Sexual
Identity of Post-Operative Transsexuals: A New Form of Sex Discrimination, 13
Am. J.L. & Med. 53, 56 (1987) ("[T]here were an estimated 6,000 post-
operative transsexuals in the United States by 1983.") (noting that, as of 1983,
"the number of post-operative transsexuals doubled in 7 years.").
23. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135, 137 (Kan. 2002)("A male-to-female post-operative transsexual does not fit the definition of a
female . . . . J'Noel [the plaintiff] remains a transsexual, and a male for
purposes of marriage."); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999),
Louisiana,24 same-sex marriage proponents may use the possible
validity of transsexual unions as grounds for their argument for
marital rights.
Moreover, since "[c]ourt battles over the issue of birth certificate
sex changing normally arise in the context of marriage," 21 it is
important to note that Louisiana permits the issuance of new birth
certificates to persons following an anatomical change of sex by
surgery.26 If such a person petitions a court and provides sufficient
proof of his change of sex, his birth record, as well as his name, may
27be altered to reflect the change. Because a certified copy of each
party's birth certificate must be provided to obtain a marriage
license,28 the newly-issued birth certificate would be used by the
post-operative transsexual.29 Thus, it seems possible that a party
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872, 121 S.Ct. 174 (2000); In re Declaratory Relief for
Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc. 2d 6, 10 (Ohio Misc. 1987) (explaining that no authority
existed in Ohio for the issuance of a marriage license to a "post-operative male
to female transsexual person and a male person."). However, other courts have
concluded that such marriages involving a transsexual may be valid. For
instance, the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in M.T. v. J.T.
announced that, though parties are born the same sex, a valid marriage may exist
between a post-operative male-to-female transsexual and a male. 355 A.2d 204
(N.J. 1976). See also Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered
People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA Women's L.J. 219, 256 (1998)
("[T]he transsexual marriage cases show courts struggling to categorize the
defendants as male or female in order to decide if their marriages were valid.")
(referring to transsexual marriage cases such as Vecchione v. Vecchione, No.
96D003769 (Orange County filed April 23, 1996)).
24. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revision of the Law of Marriage: One Baby
Step Forward, 48 La. L. Rev. 1131, 1137, n.46 (1988) (In addressing the
revisions to the articles on marriage annulments, the author explicitly notes that,
while same sex marriages are absolutely null, "[l]eft unanswered is the question
of the transsexual, who is genetically a member of one sex but by virtue of
surgery and hormone treatments is anatomically a member of the other sex.").
See also Helen G. Berrigan, Transsexual Marriage: A Trans-Atlantic Judicial
Dialogue, 12 Law & Sexuality 87, 116 (2003) ( "Only five states have directly
dealt with the question of whether transsexuals can marry. The issue is open in
all others. Louisiana is one such state.").
25. John M. Ohle, Constructing the Trannie: Transgender People and the
Law Footnote, 8 J. Gender Race & Just. 237, 255 (2004).
26. See La. R.S. 40:62 (2003).
27. Id.
28. La. R.S. 9:225-28 (2003).
29. La. R.S. 40:62 D(l) & (2) provide, in part:
[T]he original birth certificate and the copy of the petition and
judgment received by the registrar shall be sealed in a package and
filed in the archives of the vital records registry.
2006] COMMENT 569
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may enter into what he considers to be a valid marriage, though he is
unaware of his spouse's prior gender and subsequent change of birth
records and name. But, because Louisiana does not recognize
error or fraud as legitimate grounds for annulment of a marriage, the
mistaken or defrauded party in such a scenario could not have the
marriage annulled for mistake regarding the physical identity of the
person.3 1 Instead, he would have to resort to divorce laws to end the
marriage, which would preserve the validity of their union.
2. Covenant Marriage: Establishing a Solid Foundation
Second, Louisiana has exemplified its belief that marriage is a
sacred, life-long commitment through its adoption of covenant
marriage laws. Enacted in 1997, the Covenant Marriage Act
permits couples to enter into a covenant marriage only after
engaging in pre-marital counseling, signing a declaration of intent,
and agreeing to attend pre-divorce counseling, if necessary.33 Thus,
higher standards are in place for both entry into and dissolution of a
This sealed package shall be opened only upon demand of the
individual to whom the new certificate was issued, and then only by the
court which rendered the judgment ordering the issuance of the new
certificate.
30. See Melissa Aubin, Defying Classification: Intestacy Issues for
Transsexual Surviving Spouses, 82 Or. L. Rev. 1155, 1175 (2003) ("[Iln cases
involving transsexuals, courts appear to have a heightened suspicion that the
transexual will not have fully disclosed his or her sexual status."); Coombs,
supra note 23, at 256 ("The courts [which have dealt with transsexual marriage
cases] agree that the nontranssexual partner is entitled to know what he or she is
getting into, and that fraud or concealment of transsexual status are grounds to
declare the marriage void.").
31. See Coombs, supra note 23, at 261 ("Deception as to one's sexual
identity, if proven, is surely an appropriate grounds for an annulment."). See
also Spaht,, supra note 24, at n.46. Spaht argues:
The problem of the transsexual who marries another unsuspecting party
might have been considered solved by using the language in La. Civ.
Code art. 91 (1870): "mistake respecting the person." That phrase has
been eliminated . . . . However, the court is not precluded from
resorting to general principles of obligations law, such as error .... to
dispose of unanswered problems.
But see, infra Part III.A.2. (arguing that the list of marital vices of consent in the
current codal article is exclusive).
32. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis
and Legal Implications, 59 La. L. Rev. 63, 74 (1998).
33. La. R.S. 9:272-75 (2003).
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covenant marriage. As proponents have noted, "Covenant marriage
legislation, hopefully, is only the beginning of the resurgence of
interest in and protection of the institution of marriage-the
foundation upon which the 'family' is built."34 However, a solid
foundation for a marriage is not likely if it is based upon error or
fraud.
The contention that marriage will be strengthened by permitting
error and fraud as grounds for annulment initially may seem
counter-intuitive. Yet, failure to condone marriages procured
through fraud and error will actually ensure that the serious, sacred
nature of marriage continues. As the covenant marriage legislation
illustrates, our legislature approves the policy of protecting
marriage. But, the legislature simultaneously disregards this policy
by implicitly stating that error and fraud are acceptable components
of a marriage contract. To exemplify its adherence to the tenets of
marriage announced in article 86 3 ("marriage is between a man and
a woman") and to reiterate its commitment to the marital
relationship, the Louisiana Legislature should re-institute error and
fraud as grounds for annulling a marriage.
3. Divorce Laws: Distinguishing Between Annulment and
Divorce
Third, Louisiana employs an extremely liberal approach to
resolving contested divorce cases;36 however, the ease with which a
divorce can now be obtained does not remedy the state's narrow
allowance of annulments. 37  In distinguishing between situations
34. Spaht, supra note 32, at 83 (citation omitted).
35. La. Civ. Code art. 86 ("Marriage; definition") provides: "Marriage is a
legal relationship between a man and a woman that is created by civil contract.
The relationship and the contract are subject to special rules prescribed by law."
36. Couples must live "separate and apart" for six months before being
granted a "no-fault" divorce; only Louisiana and Montana recognize such a
short time period. See John R. Trahan, Louisiana Civil Law: Persons & the
Family, Unilateral Divorce for Merely "Living Separate and Apart," A State-by-
State Comparison (2003) (on file with author); see also Linda D. Elrod & Robert
G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Increased Mobility Creates
Conflicts, 36 Fam. L.Q. 515, 562 (2003) ("Chart 4: Grounds for Divorce and
Residency Requirements"). See also La. Civ. Code arts. 102-03.
37. One might argue that Louisiana's limited recognition of annulments
strengthens the marital bonds by forcing couples to endure, at a minimum, a six
month period of separation before the attainment of a divorce. But, this brief
2006]
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calling for annulment and those best resolved by divorce, the timing
of the actionable vice is key. In a divorce proceeding, the
determinative event usually occurs after the marriage ceremony;
thus, the spouses have both freely consented to the union and only
later have decided to terminate the relationship. 38 However, in an
annulment action, the vitiating circumstance is present at the time of
the marriage ceremony. 39  Indeed, because of the vitiating
circumstance, the innocent spouse is unable to freely abstain from
entry into the marital relationship. Had the vice been known to him
(in the case of error or fraud) or eliminated (in the case of duress),
he would never have consented to the marriage in the first place.
40
As one commentator emphasized, "When defects existing at the
time of the marriage ceremony cause the union to be invalid,
annulment is the proper remedy."41  Because divorce merely
dissolves a valid marriage, it is an insufficient remedy for
dissolution of a marriage invalid from its inception.
C. Louisiana's Present Approach to the Marital Vices of Consent
Though the 1870 Civil Code recognized error, fraud, and duress
as sufficient vices of consent of a marriage contract, the current
time limitation has not provided such a deterrent. Instead, Massachusetts, which
permits annulments for error, fraud, or duress, has the lowest divorce rate in the
United States. See William V. D'Antonio, Walking the Walk on Family Values,
The Boston Globe, Oct. 31, 2004, at Ell, available at http://www.
boston.con/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2004/10/31/walking-the
walkonfamilyvalues/.
38. May Bamforth Hubert, Comment, The Annulment of Marriages in
Louisiana, 24 Tul. L. Rev. 217, 217 (1949-1950) ("[A] divorce can obviously
be granted for causes which occur only after the marriage ...."); see also Caleb
Foote et al., Cases and Materials on Family Law 92 (Little, Brown and
Company, 3d ed. 1985) (emphasizing that "divorce assumes a valid marriage
and is granted for conditions that have developed since marriage.").
39. Hubert, supra note 38, at 217 (noting that "annulment can be decreed
only for a cause which existed prior to the marriage or contemporaneously with
it."); see also Foote, supra note 38, at 92 ("An annulment is appropriate where
there has never been a valid marriage because of defects existing at the time of
the ceremony. .. ").
40. Laurence Drew Borten, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in
Marriage, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1089, 1094 (2002) (explaining an annulment:
"Had all facts been known to the parties and the state beforehand, the marriage
should not have taken place.").
41. Note, supra note 5, at 148.
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Civil Code fails to recognize both error and fraud.42 As justification
for the elimination of "mistake respecting the person," the Louisiana
State Law Institute4 3 claimed that the vice "had been so narrowly
interpreted by the jurisprudence that it was obsolete." 44  But,
"[b]ecause something occurs rarely should not mean that the law
should not provide for it. The law exists to prevent disputes from
arising, as well as to solve disputes which do.''45 Further, it is well
established in the civilian tradition that a civil code is intended as an
anticipatory device,46 as opposed to the judicial decisions of the
common law, which deal with particular situations only as they
arise.47 Elimination of this potential cause for annulment seems to
defeat this traditional civilian notion, making American jurisdictions
that do recognize potential grounds for nullity in marriage other than
duress seem more in line with civilian traditions than Louisiana, the
42. La. Civ. Code art. 93; see supra text accompanying note 18.
43. Marcel Planiol, 1 Elementary Treatise on the Civil Law: Conforming to
the Official Program of the Faculties of Law VIII (La. State Law Inst. trans.,
12th ed. 1958) (1938) ("The Louisiana State Law Institute was chartered,
created and organized as an official law revision commission, law reform
agency, and legal research agency of the State of Louisiana by Act 166 of the
Legislature of 1938.").
44. Spaht, supra note 24, at 1144-45 (1988). But see Thomas E.
Carbonneau, The Family and the Civil Code: Teaching Materials on the
Louisiana Law of Domestic Relations 63 (Claitor's Publ'g Div. 1983) ("The
litigation under Article 91 has not been extensive and is dated; as a result, many
of the cases--either in their reasoning or result--may appear to be obsolete.").
45. Valentina Zace, Albania: Family Law Under the Dictatorship of the
Proletariat, 33 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 259, 263 (1994-1995) (arguing in
response to the failure of Albanian law to recognize sham marriages as sufficient
grounds for annulment because of the Proletariat's determination that "such
cases are very rare and divorce laws can take care of them."); see also Marcel
Planiol, 1 Treatise on the Civil Law § 1, nos. 1-1609, 994 (La. State Law Inst.
trans., 12th ed., 1959) (1939) (Describing the Code Napoleon, the author asserts,
"[t]he law maker's intention was to foresee everything and to regulate
everything.").
46. See F.H. Lawson, A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law 80
(Greenwood Press Publishers 1955) ("[T]he law might and should look
essentially to the future, together with the companion idea that the perfect form
of law was statute law and the perfect form of statute a coherent, systematic
code."); Barry Nicholas, French Law of Contract 6 (Butterworth & Co. Ltd.
1982) ("A code in the strict sense is a systematic and complete statement of a
body of law.").47. Nicholas, supra note 46, at 5 (noting that "for him (the Common




only mixed jurisdiction in the United States.4 8  Moreover, though
lacunae exist in even the most carefully-crafted civil code,49 such
gaps do not afford the judge liberal legislative power;50 instead, in
the absence of legislation, the Louisiana judge must seek customary
law.51 Thus, the civil law judge is still not permitted to formulate
new legislation. 52 In order to consistently emphasize the importance
of marriage and to appropriately adhere to its civilian roots, the
Louisiana Legislature should re-institute error and fraud as grounds
for annulment of a marriage.
Ill. A HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE THREE VICES OF CONSENT:
ERROR, FRAUD, AND DURESS
Article 1948 of the Louisiana Civil Code sets out the vices of
consent for conventional obligations and contracts. It provides,
48. See, e.g., Warren M. Billings, Mixed Jurisdictions and Convergence:
The Louisiana Example, 29 Int'l J. Legal Info. 272, 273 (2001) ("Louisiana law
is unique. That uniqueness originated in a singular convergence of
contingencies which pitted French and Anglo-American legal traditions against
one another . . . spawn[ing] an unusual jurisdiction in which the French ways
predominated and distinguished Louisiana from legal regimes elsewhere in the
Union.").
49. John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the
Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America 43 (Stanford University
Press, 2d ed. 1985) ("[T]he dogma that a code can be complete and coherent
fails to survive even a cursory glance at the jurisprudence .... [T]he books are
full of decisions in which the court has had to fill gaps in the legislative scheme
and reconcile apparently conflicting statutes.").
50. John Henry Merryman, The Italian Style III: Interpretation, 18 Stan. L.
Rev. 583, 596 ("Lacunae are filled from within the legislative scheme rather
than from without... so there is no need to resort to the creative power of the
judge.").
51. See La. Civ. Code art. 1 ("The sources of law are legislation and
custom."); La. Civ. Code art. 3 ("Custom results from practice repeated for a
long time and generally accepted as having acquired the force of law. Custom
may not abrogate legislation."); and La. Civ. Code art. 1 cmt. (b) ("[L]egislation
and custom are authoritative or primary sources of law. They are contrasted
with persuasive or secondary sources of law, such as jurisprudence, doctrine,
conventional usages, and equity, that may guide the court in the absence of
legislation and custom.").
52. Boris Starck, Droit Civil: Introduction, n. 132-140, 57-61 (J.R. Trahan
trans., Libraries Techniques 2d ed. 1976) (1997) ("The requirement that thejudge base every decision on a legislative text (or some other source of law) puts




"Consent may be vitiated by error, fraud, or duress." 53 Though the
1870 Louisiana Civil Code used different language in the context of
consent to the marital contract, the result was the same. Article 91
dictated that consent to a marriage was not free when (1) "given to a
ravisher;" (2) "extorted by violence;" or (3) "there is a mistake
respecting the person." 54 Article 91's reference to "violence" was
indicative of duress.55  "Mistake respecting the person" was
interpreted as a corollary of error.56 With regard to the traditional
vice of fraud, courts and scholars defined it as "merely induced
mistake and therefore ... within the terms of Article 91(3) [mistake
respecting the person]." Thus, in the context of marriage, the 1870
Civil Code recognized the three classic vices of consent applicable
to all contracts.
In 1987, the Louisiana Legislature, on recommendation of the
Louisiana State Law Institute, enacted Act Number 886.58 The
Louisiana State Law Institute redrafted the chapters dealing with
marriage, 59 and the recognized vices of consent to a valid marriage
53. La. Civ. Code art. 1948.
54. La. Civ. Code art. 91 (1870) (quoted supra note 17).
55. See George M. Snellings, III, Louisiana Law on the Nullity of Marriage,
20 La. L. Rev. 563, 565 (1959-1960); Spaht, supra note 24 at 1144; see, e.g.,
Fowler v. Fowler, 131 La. 1088, 1091, 60 So. 694, 695 (1913) (Interpreting
"extorted by violence," the court observed that "in order that a marriage
obtained through duress may be validated, it is necessary that the ratification be
after the duress has ceased to be operative."); Succession of Barth, 178 La. 847,
850, 152 So. 543, 544 (1934); Lacoste v. Guidroz, 47 La. Ann. 295, 16 So. 836
(1895).
56. See, e.g., McKee v. McKee, 262 So.2d 111, 113 (La. App. 2d. Cir.
1972) (Interpreting "mistake respecting the person," the court stated, "The error,
or lack of consent contemplated by the codal provisions relates to the identity of
a person and not to the quality, age, or name of the person with whom one has
entered into a contract of marriage.").
57. Verneuille v. Verneuille, 438 So.2d 615, 617 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied 443 So.2d 596 (1983); see Hubert, supra note 38, at 219; R.B.L., Note,
Marriage and Annulment-Fraud: Concealment of Nationality, 3 La. L. Rev.
831, 832 (1940-1941) (noting that in the courts of Louisiana, "fraud is limited to
a mistake of person, which has been construed to mean a mistake in physical
identity.").
58. 1987 La. Acts No. 886; see also Spaht, supra note 24, at 1131.
59. Hearing on H.B. 1717 Before the Subcomm. on Judiciary A, 1987 Leg.
2 (La. 1987) (Representative Fernandez explained that the bill "would
distinguish what the marriage contract is about, describing what the vices of
consent are, describing as absolute nullities those that are contracted by
procuration or those that are contracted in spite of legal impediments.").
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were decreased in number and simplified in wording. 6° The most
recent version of the Civil Code article detailing the vices of consent
applicable to marriage provides as follows: "Consent is not free
when given under duress or when given by a person incapable of
discernment. ' '6 1  With the deletion of "mistake respecting the
person," both error and fraud-recognized in the 1870 Code-have
been eliminated; thus, recognition of the traditional vices is no more.
A. Establishing the Elimination of Error and Fraud
The vices of error and fraud are not only absent from the
statutory language of the present article on marriage annulments, but
application of the vices by way of extension is also foreclosed
because of the special nature of a marriage contract and the
exclusivity of the annulment article.
1. Marriage as a Contract
Though Louisiana's Civil Code defines marriage as a "civil
contract," 62 this notion is often questioned.
There is a tension between the conception of marriage as a
status (conferred and recognized by the state with privileges
granted to married persons and denied to unmarried persons)
and as a contract (which can be entered into by the parties of
their own free will and then will be recognized by the state).
If marriage were merely a contract, then anyone could enter
the marriage relationship by agreement and obtain its
benefits. This is not the law.
63
60. Compare La. Civ. Code art. 91 (1870) (quoted supra note 17), with La.
Civ. Code art. 93 (quoted supra note 18).
61. La. Civ. Code art. 93.
62. La. Civ. Code art. 86.
63. Joseph William Singer, Introduction to Property 374 (2001); see
Katherine Shaw Spaht, A Proposal: Legal Re-Regulation of the Content of
Marriage, 18 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y. 243, 246 (2004)
("Historically, the law of Louisiana, as was true of the law of other states as well
as other countries in the West, highly regulated entry into marriage.");
Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 323 So.2d 120, 126 (La. 1975) ("[T]he state has broad
authority to regulate the status of marriage.").
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The recognition of a special place for a marriage contract,
separated from traditional obligations, calls into question the
propriety of applying general obligations laws to the contract. The
generally accepted view is that, "[b]ecause of its special nature, the
contract of marriage is subject to rules of its own concerning vices
of consent;" 64 this forecloses application of the vices of consent for
general obligations to the marriage contract. Thus, state regulation
of marriage requires strict adherence to the specific articles allocated
for this particular contract. As such, the elimination of fraud and
error from the article detailing the particular vices of consent in the
marriage context seems to have completely eliminated their
application, even by way of analogy.
2. Louisiana's Present Article on the Vices of Marital Consent:
Exclusive or Illustrative?
While it may be argued that the vices of consent announced in
Article 93 (the present article) are not exclusive, comment (a)
provides, "[t]his Article [93] carries forward the most important
provisions of its sources"65---specifically, articles 90 and 91 of the
1870 Code and the associated jurisprudence. 66 Noticeably absent
64. Saul Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress and an Epilogue
on Lesion, 50 La. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1989) [hereinafter Litvinoff, Vices of Consent];
see also Saul Litvinoff, Good Faith, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 1645, 1647-1648 (1997)
("[Aiccording to the Louisiana Civil Code, marriage is a legal relation created
by civil contract, but its peculiar institutional nature, plus the fact that it is not a
contract intended to give rise to credit-rights, places it outside the ambit of the
law of obligations and within the realm of family law.").
65. La. Civ. Code art. 93 cmt. (a).
66. La. Civ. Code art. 90 (1870) ("Essentials of Valid Marriage") provided:
As the law considers marriage in no other view than that of a civil
contract, it sanctions all those marriages where the parties, at the time
of making them, were:
1. Willing to contract;
2. Able to contract;
3. Did contract pursuant to the forms and solemnities prescribed by
law.
See supra note 17 (text of La. Civ. Code art. 91 (1870)); La. Civ. Code art. 93
cmt. (b) (referencing Fowler v. Fowler, 131 La. 1088, 60 So. 694 (1913)
(duress); Quealy v. Waldron, 126 La. 258, 52 So. 479 (1910) (duress);
Grundmeyer v. Sander, 175 La. 189, 143 So. 45 (1932) (duress); Lacoste v.
Guidroz, 47 La.Ann. 295, 16 So. 836 (1895) (duress)); La. Civ. Code art. 93
cmt. (c) (which references Stier v. Price, 214 La. 394, 37 So.2d 847 (1948) (the
Comment incorrectly cites the date as being 1899, the year of the Delpit
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from the comments to the present article is any indication that the
article is not intended to change the law. 67 Thus, the elimination of
"mistake respecting the person" was intended to and actually did
serve to erase the vices of both error and fraud,68 leaving only duress
as a cause for nullification.
Article 95 ("Relatively null marriage; confirmation")
supplements article 93 by explaining the effects of vitiated
consent.69  However, resorting to the articles cross-referenced by
articles 93 and 95 still does not warrant application of the general
articles on obligations. First, it is interesting that neither article
references the other, though they are clearly related.7 ° Moreover,
despite its reference to article 1948,71 which lists the three vices of
consent in conventional contracts and obligations, article 95 only
notes two specific articles on error.7 2  Absent from its cross-
reference list are any of the articles on fraud or duress; this is odd, as
duress is the only explicitly noted vice in the earlier article.73
Further, the mere cross-reference to two articles dealing with error
fails to supplement the omission of the vice from either of the
marriage articles themselves. Notably, article 1950 ("Error that
decision) (insanity); and Sabalot v. Populus, 31 La.Ann. 854 (1879) (insanity)
(Delpit v. Young is not cited, which indicates that even the limited application
of "error respecting the person" has been eliminated.).
67. Compare La. Civ. Code art. 93 cmt. (a) with La. Civ. Code art. 92 cmt.
(a).
68. Hearing on H.B. 1139 Before the Civil Law and Procedure Comm.,
1987 Leg. (La. 1987) (statement of Professor Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana
State Law Institute, Paul M. Hebert Law Center) (After indicating that proposed
changes were made to the article detailing the marital vices of consent, the
speaker notes, "if [consent is] given under duress, that incorporates two of the
three examples given presently in article 91," namely consent given to a ravisher
and consent extorted by violence. She then emphasizes that the only other noted
vice, "incapable of discernment, is a new term for the civil code." As such, the
"mistake respecting the person" language has not been incorporated into the
revised article.).
69. La. Civ. Code art. 95 (which begins, "[a] marriage is relatively null
when the consent of one of the parties to marry is not freely given.").
70. La. Civ. Code art. 93 (which begins, "Consent is not free ... "
(emphasis added)); La. Civ. Code art. 95 (which applies "when the consent of
one of the parties to marry is not freely given." (emphasis added)).
71. La. Civ. Code art. 1948 ("Vitiated consent"); see supra text
accompanying note 53.
72. La. Civ. Code art. 1949 ("Error vitiates consent"); La. Civ. Code art.
1950 ("Error that concerns cause").
73. La. Civ. Code art. 93.
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Concerns Cause"), one of the two referenced articles, encompasses
all of the recognized causes of error, going well beyond "mistake
respecting the person." 74  If one is to rely upon these cross-
referenced articles, it would seem that all recognized forms of error
now permit annulment of a marriage-surely, this is not the case.
Further, not only was the Code originally published without cross-
references, 75 but the inaccuracy of the cross-references has also been
noted. 76 Therefore, reliance on any of the cross-referenced articles
seems baseless.
B. Historical Analysis of "Mistake Respecting the Person"
Louisiana's current position on annulments of marriage is the
result of conflicting historical interpretations of its French source
article, as evidenced by French commentary and Louisiana
jurisprudence.
1. The Vice of Error and its Evolution
As the more disputed of the two vices encompassed by "mistake
respecting the person," the marital vice of error was the catalyst for
the state's present non-recognition of both error and fraud as
sufficient grounds for nullifying a marriage.
a. The Conflicting Interpretations of the French Civil Code
Article
The source article for former Louisiana Civil Code article
91--article 14677 of the Code Napoleon, in conjunction with article
18078 of the Code Napoleon-has been given to competing
74. See infra Part IV.A. 1.
75. Robert Anthony Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 La. L. Rev. 301,
306 (1998) ("Published as they were originally, without titles to articles, without
cross-references, case references, comments, and notes of various kinds, our
Digest and Codes were eminently readable documents.").
76. See, e.g., Symeon Symeonides, Property, 45 La. L. Rev. 541, 542 n.12
(1984) (With regards to article 2726, "[t]he cross-reference was incorrect and
was instead meant to be a reference to article 495.").
77. C. Civ. art. 146 provides: "Consent is essential to the validity of a
marriage." Edmond Kelly, M.A., The French Law of Marriage and the Conflict
of Laws that Arises Therefrom 112 (Fred B. Rothnan & Co. 1985).
78. C. Civ. art. 180 provides:
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interpretations. 79  During the drafting of the Code Napoleon,80
Napoleon himself demanded that mistake as to the qualities of the
person be a basis for annulment.8 ' In Napoleon's opinion, "'error in
the person' as a ground for annulling a marriage, should be
considered as meaning the same thing, or as including within its
meaning, 'error in the character, attributes, or quality of the
person.',, 8 2 The views of several French commentators accorded
with Napoleon's opinion, as they believed that the vice "should not
be restricted to errors in physical identity but should include some
errors as to quality such as impotence, prostitution, and former
conviction of felony."
83
Affirming this interpretation was Marcad6, a preeminent
nineteenth century French scholar who wrote an explication of the
Code Napoleon.8 4  In this work, Marcad6 referenced two cases
involving mistakes respecting the qualities of the persons, not the
actual physical identities, wherein the courts annulled marriages.8
5
The first case, decided in 1811 by the Court of Agen, involved a
An action to annul a marriage contracted without the free consent of the
married persons or of one of them, can only be brought by the married
person or persons whose consent has not been free. Where mistake has
occurred in the person, an action to annul the marriage may only be
brought by the party who has been mistaken.
See Kelly, supra note 77, at 122 (indicating that article 180 "must be read in
connection with Article 146 on the subject of Consent. Article 146 provides for
the absence of consent, Article 180 for a defective consent.").
79. G.H.R., Note, Marriage-Annulment on the Ground of Mistake, 23 Tul.
L. Rev. 582, 582-83 (1949); Hubert, supra note 38, at 219.
80. Planiol, supra note 43, at 49. Those commissioned by Bonaparte, "First
Consul and the all powerful master of France," were: Tronchet, president of the
Tribunal of Cassation; Bigot du Preameneu, a commissioner of the Government
attached to that Tribunal; Portalis, a commissioner of the Government attached
to the Prize Tribunal and Malleville, a judge of the Tribunal of Cassation.
81. Hubert, supra note 38, at 220 (referencing Marcad6).
82. Delpit v. Young, 51 La. Ann. 923, 928, 25 So. 547, 549 (La. 1899)
(citing Marcad6); see also M.W.M., Note, Marriage-Annulment-
Misrepresentation as to Health-Venereal Diseases, 15 Tul. L. Rev. 477, 479
(1941).
83. Hubert, supra note 38, at 220 n.13-14 (citing 1 Victor Marcadd,
Explication du Code Napoleon 476 no. 637 (Cotillion 5th ed. 1859) and 2
Alexandre Duranton, Cours de Droit Francais 47 no. 63 (4th ed. 1844)); Delpit,
51 La. Ann. at 930, 25 So. at 549 (referencing Demolombe and Marcad6).
84. See 1 Victor Marcad6, Explication du Code Napoleon 476 no. 637
(Cotillion 5th ed. 1859).
85. See, e.g., Delpit, 51 La. Ann. at 928, 25 So. at 549.
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woman who mistakenly married a priest.86 The second decision,
rendered by the Court of Bourges in 1827, involved the
misrepresentation by an adventurer that he was an Italian baron; his
deception as to his fortune and status was found to justify an
annulment.
8 7
Before the Code Napoleon's adoption, error as a vice sufficient
to nullify a marriage was thought to exist solely when the error
related to physical identity.8 8 The only recognized exception was
when a person married a slave believing that he or she was free. 9
However, the Code Napoleon's article on the marital vices of
consent originated in Pothier's Mariage,90 wherein the preeminent
scholar distinguished between different types of error.9 1
Commentators have recognized that Pothier's examples of these
types of error were actually based upon mere qualities of the person,
not physical identity.92
86. Id. at 926, 25 So. at 549; Kelly, supra note 77, at 123. In addition to
these cases, theauthor notes the following:
The Court of Colmar on the 6th December, 1811, decided that a Catholic
woman who, without knowing it, married a man who had once been a
monk, could set up such mistake to invalidate the marriage. So also did
the Court of Agen hold as to the mistake of a woman who had married a
priest (S.60, 2, 353). Again the Court of Chaumont held that a man could
set up the pregnancy of his wife unknown to him prior to marriage, so as to
invalidate the same (S. 58, 2, 543).
Id.
87. Delpit, 51 La. Ann. at 929, 25 So. at 549; Kelly, supra note 77, at 123.
88. Delpit, 51 La. Ann. at 927, 25 So. at 549.
89. Id. (citing Pothier, Traite du contrat de marriage, n. 308, 310 and 311
(Letellier 1813)).
90. Planiol, supra note 45, at 1061 (referencing Pothier, supra note 85, at
308-14). "Art. 180 is merely the reproduction of Pothier's doctrine." Id.
91. Id. Pothier's examples are as follows:
(1) error regarding the person, which absolutely destroys consent and
prevents the marriage from taking place. "[I1f, desiring to marry Marie
... I pledge my troth to Jeanne, who represents herself to be Mae...
there is no meeting of two minds, because if Jeanne desired to marry
me, I did not desire to marry Jeanne."
(2) error regarding the qualities of the person, which do not prevent the
marriage from being valid "because it is not of the essence of marriage
that the woman I marry have the qualities, I think she has. It suffices
that it be she whom I desired to marry.
92. Id. at 1061 n.6. The author states:
Even in the case formulated by Pothier the mistake does not apply to
the physical person. Jeanne appeared under the name of Marie. But it
was Jeanne whom her husband desired to marry. He thought that her
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Nevertheless, more contemporary French scholars exclude
mistake respecting the qualities of the person from the vices of
consent.93 As noted when Louisiana's former article on marital
vices of consent was in place, "Louisiana's position seems
consistent with that of the more modem French authorities." 94 Now
that Louisiana has completely eliminated "mistake respecting the
person," is Louisiana consistent with any authority?
b. Delpit v. Young: Establishing the Louisiana Judiciary's
Narrow Interpretation
The seminal case with respect to former article 91 is Delpit v.
Young. 95 Decided in 1899 by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the
case enunciated the court's interpretation of "mistake respecting the
person. 96 Reading the statutory language in its most narrow sense,
the court relied heavily upon its explication of article 91's French
source article in finding that "mistake respecting the person" was
limited to error as to the person's physical identity. 97  While
acknowledging that French scholars, including Marcad and
Demolombe, believed that "error in the person" encompassed error
in the qualities of the person, the court concluded that only error in
the physical identity of the person was contemplated by the French
article.9
8
To support its conclusion, the court noted,
[T]he Civil Code was first adopted in Louisiana before either
of the cases referred to by Marcad had been decided, and
hence, in all probability, at a time when the interpretation of
the French law as given by Pothier and the older writers still
name was Marie and that she was a member of a family that was not
hers. These are mere qualities.
93. Snellings, supra note 55, at 566-67 (citing Aubry and Rau, as well as
Baudry-Lacantinerie and Houques-Fourcade).
94. Id. at 567.
95. 51 La. Ann. 923, 25 So. 547 (La. 1899).
96. La. Civ. Code art. 91(3) (1870).
97. Delpit, 51 La. Ann. at 931, 25 So. at 550.
98. Id. at 930, 25 So. at 550.
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obtained, and there was no reason to suppose that any other
interpretation would be placed on it.
99
However, the court's reasoning is flawed. To rebut the Delpit
court's presumption, it is necessary to provide a brief history of the
Louisiana Civil Code.
The 1808 Digest, drafted by James Brown and Louis Moreau-
Lislet, is considered the first Louisiana Civil Code. °° Though the
Digest was structurally modeled after the Code Napoleon,1Ul the
origin of the Digest's source articles continues to be debated. °2
After the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that "the 1808 Digest was
merely an incomplete reproduction of then-existing laws,"'1 3 the
legislature authorized Pierre Derbigny, Moreau-Lislet, and Edward
Livingston to draft what became the Civil Code of 1825.104 In
contrast to the disputes over the sources of the 1808 Digest,10 5 it is
well settled that "the drafters of the 1825 Code relied heavily on
French doctrine and jurisprudence, most notably the French Civil
Code.' 1° 6 Following the Civil War, the legislature found revision of
99. Id.
100. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: A Commemorative
Essay, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 379, 386 (2003) ("Governor Claiborne approved the
Digest that came to be known as the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808.").
101. Id., at 387 ("While the drafters of the Louisiana Civil Code based the
Digest on a variety of sources, they followed the French Civil Code as a
model."); J.R. Trahan, The Continuing Influence of Le Droit Civil and El
Derecho Civil in the Private Law of Louisiana, 63 La. L. Rev. 1019, 1026
(2003) (Asserting that "the Digest was heavily indebted to the French civil-law
tradition," the author emphasizes the likenesses between the Digest's structure
and the structure of the French Civil Code.).
102. See, e.g., Alain A. Levasseur, Grandeur or Mockery?, 42 Loy. L. Rev.
647, 648 (1997) ("What remains the object of some controversy today is the
absolute and definitive identification of the sources of law that Moreau Lislet
used in drafting the Digest of 1808."); Vernon Valentine Palmer, The French
Connection and the Spanish Perception: Historical Debates and Contemporary
Evaluation of French Influence on Louisiana Civil Law, 63 La. L. Rev. 1067,
1069 (2003) ("Some scholars theorize that the Legislature intended to codify
Spanish substantive ideas and merely used French-language equivalents out of
convenience . . . [O]ther scholars, based upon meticulous tracing and
overwhelming evidence of verbatim and almost verbatim borrowings, believe
that the true sources were French.").
103. Yiannopoulos, supra note 100, at 387; see also Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart
(o.s.) 93 (La. 1817).
104. 1822 La. Acts No. 108; John H. Tucker, Jr., Foreword, Louisiana Civil
Code (2003), ("The real civil code was that of 1825.").
105. See sources cited supra note 102.
106. Yiannopoulos, supra note 100, at 388.
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the Code to be necessary. 1°7 In 1870, the Revised Civil Code of the
State of Louisiana, drafted by John Ray and three fellow attorneys,
was adopted by the state.'08 Essentially, this Code was "a verbatim
reenactment"' 109 of the 1825 Code, as its main alteration was the
repeal of slavery articles. 110 As such, it is more likely that the
French influence upon the 1825 Code, as opposed to the 1808
version, was reflected in the 1870 Code in place when the Delpit
decision was rendered.' 11 This timely influence is essential, as one
of the two cases noted by Marcad6 was decided prior to the
enactment of the 1825 Louisiana Civil Code. 112 Specifically, the
1811 case in which the court granted an annulment to a woman who
mistakenly married a priest was not based upon a physical mistake
of identity, but rather upon a mistake of status.
Further, though the 1899 Delpit court addressed the concept of
mistake, the discussion was not essential to its decision. Referring
to the court's interpretation of the article as "dicta,' 1 13 many
scholars emphasize that the facts of the case were weak, 114 as they
merely involved a claim by the husband that his wife had concealed
that she was unchaste prior to their marriage. Such claims were
likewise dismissed in other jurisdictions, though these jurisdictions
107. Palmer, supra note 102, at 1110. Palmer also notes that "[t]here was a
technical revision of the Civil Code which took place in 1870, but this came
after the Civil War and was designed only to expurgate provisions dealing with
slavery which of course by then were unconstitutional." Id. at 1109.
108. Yiannopoulos, supra note 100, at 389.
109. Vernon Valentine Palmer, Panelist, The Great Debate Over the
Louisiana Civil Code's Revision, 5 Tul. Civ. L.F. 49, 52 (1990).
110. Id.; see also Palmer, supra note 102, at 1109; Yiannopoulos, supra note
100, at 389.
111. Yiannopoulos, supra note 100, at 389.
112. Id.
113. G.H.R., supra note 79, at 583; see also Snellings, supra note 55, at 567
(referring to the court's interpretation of "mistake respecting the person" as
"dictum").
114. G.H.R., supra note 79, at 583-84. The author emphasizes the
following:
The Louisiana courts have never been confronted with strong fact
situations such as fraudulent concealment of the paternity of a child or
concealment of a venereal disease .... If such a situation should arise
it is possible that the courts would not follow the dictum of Delpit v.
Young, but would allow an annulment of the marriage on the theory
that compelling a man to remain married under these conditions would
be contrary to public policy, because it would sanction a personal
relationship which would produce discord.
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still recognized error as a basis for annulment. 115 Thus, the court's
mistake discussion was unnecessary to its finding. Should a
definitive court decision, rather than dictum, have led to the
elimination of error and fraud as vices of marital consent?" 16
The Delpit court also utilized a historical method of
interpretation1 7 by analyzing the French source article and its
associated explanations. However, the court later refutes this
comparative methodology in its opinion. 19 Distinguishing between
French and American society, the court emphasized the separation
of church and state in America, as well as our country's lack of
distinct social classes. Noting that "it seems better to interpret our
marriage law without the aid of criticism which is inappropriate to
the conditions under which it was enacted and to which it is
intended to apply,"'120 the court rebuffed reliance upon French
interpretation and rendered its prior discussion inapplicable.
The Delpit court concluded its opinion by referencing the 1897
English case of Moss v. Moss.12 1 In Moss, the English High Court
denied an annulment to a man deceived into believing that his wife
was pregnant with his child at the time of marriage, when, in fact,
she was pregnant by another man. In its opinion, the Moss court
referred to and criticized American courts that had permitted
annulments under similar circumstances. 1
22
Nevertheless, the Moss decision fails to bolster the Delpit court's
argument, as English law provides neither the source for the
pertinent Louisiana annulment article nor the foundation for our
civilian tradition. 123  Of interest, the Moss decision has been
115. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen 605, 610 (Mass. 1862); Barnes
v. Barnes, 42 P. 904, 905 (Cal. 1895); Joy v. Joy, 12 Ohio Dec. 574 (Ohio Misc.
1900).
116. Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the
Law 432 (Harvard University Press rev. ed. 1974) (referring to dicta as
"nonauthorative statements" which "may be disregarded by the judge deciding
the later case.").
117. See, e.g., Francois Terr6, Introduction Generale au Droit nos. 471-73, at
474-78 (J.R. Trahan trans., 4th ed. 2001) (1998).
118. Delpit v. Young, 51 La. Ann. 923, 926-31, 25 So. 547, 548-50 (La.
1899).
119. Carbonneau, supra note 44, at 77.
120. Delpit, 51 La. Ann. at 931, 25 So. at 550.
121. (1897) P. 263.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
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statutorily overruled, as pregnancy by another man at the time of
marriage is now a recognized ground for annulment in England.
124
Therefore, Moss v. Moss was of no relevance at the time of the
Delpit decision, nor is it of any importance now.
As the Delpit case illustrates, the courts are reluctant to broadly
interpret even explicit vices found in the article concerning the vices
of consent in the context of marriage. 125 Hence, elimination of this
language from article 93 completely prevents judicial recognition of
either error or fraud. 126 Because legislation is a primary source of
law, Louisiana courts are unable to apply these vices to the contract
of marriage without express directives emanating from the
legislature. 127  As such, the possibility for a court to extend its
interpretation of "mistake respecting the person" has been severed
along with the language in the revision process.
2. The Vice of Fraud and its Limited Recognition
124. See Matrimonial Causes Act, § 12(f) (1973). See also, J.C. Hall, M.A.,
LL.B., Sources of Family Law 54 n.2 (Cambridge at the University Press 1966)
(noting that "[p]regnancy per alium was made a specific ground for nullity by
statute in 1937.").
125. See Stier v. Price, 37 So. 2d 847, 848 (Referring to "the specific grounds
for the nullity of marriages," the Court indicated that "plaintiff must bring
herself within the strict provisions thereof in order to prevail in these
proceedings."); see also Linda D. Elrod & the Honorable James P. Buchele,
Kansas Law and Practice: Kansas Family Law § 9.82 (2003) (In contrast to
Louisiana's strict interpretations, the authors note, "[a]s a practical matter when
a couple has been married a short time, is young with no children, a court may
use its equitable powers to grant an annulment even when technically the
grounds may be weak.").
126. Pascal, supra note 75, at 305. "[T]he lawyer working with codified civil
law should inquire how his situation already has been ordered by the enacted
law... The lawyer and the judge ought not to participate in the making of law."
Id. The author later notes, "Neither the Digest of 1808 nor the Civil Codes of
1825 and 1870 permit the decisions of judges to be considered declarative of
authoritative rules of law." Id. at 307.
127. Spaht, supra note 63, at 250 (noting that, in Louisiana, as a civil lawjurisdiction, "the law of the family, including that of husband and wife, is the
subject of codification . . . [and] is not dependant upon judicial decisions to
formulate and reassert legal regulation of the content of marriage."); Planiol,
supra note 45, at n.994 ("The law maker ... determined to leave nothing to the
chances of a law suit . . . . [All the nullities which the law maker cared to
recognize are there [in a special chapter devoted to the nullities of marriage]
regulated .... All causes of nullity not set forth in and regulated by Chapter IV
of the Title 'Of Marriage' must be rejected.").
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Though not included in Article 91's listing of consensual vices
to the marriage contract, historically, both doctrine and
jurisprudence have recognized the inclusion of fraud.' 28 Scholars
often note that "fraud is merely induced mistake and therefore
would come within the terms of Article 91(3). ' 129
This view was judicially sanctioned by the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal in Verneuille v. Verneuille. 3 ° Rendered in
1983, before the revision of article 91, Verneuille involved a
husband's allegation that "he was induced to marry . . . solely
because of [the plaintiff' s] false and fraudulent representation that
the child she was carrying was his."'13 1 Purposefully conforming his
assertion to the article, the husband pleaded that when he contracted
the marriage, he "was acting under a mistake and in error as to the
entire identity of the defendant."' 32 While conceding that fraud is
recognized under article 91(3), the court cited Delpit v. Young and
concluded that "the jurisprudence interpreting Article 91(3),
however, strictly confines the phrase 'mistake respecting the person'
to mean 'mistake respecting the physical identity of the person."'
133
Therefore, the husband's allegation failed to conform to this narrow
interpretation.
Likely based on the narrow reading of "mistake respecting the
person" under article 91(3), no other Louisiana court has specifically
addressed the application of fraud to the marriage contract under this
statute. Fraud has been discussed in connection to putative
marriages, 134 but such marriages are instead governed by article 96
128. See sources cited supra note 57.
129. Hubert, supra note 38, at 220; see also R.B.L., supra note 57, at 832
(indicating that "fraud is limited to a mistake of person, which has been
construed to mean a mistake in physical identity.").
130. 438 So.2d 615 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
131. Id. at616.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 617.
134. See, e.g., Evans v. Eureka Grand Lodge, Free and Accepted Masons,
Etc., 149 So. 305, 306 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933) The court provides:
The law measurably protects the innocent party to a bigamous marriage
so long as his or her good faith continues. It ceases this benign attitude
the moment the innocent party becomes wise to the facts and does not
avail himself or herself of the opportunity to prove good faith by
disavowing a contract to the execution of which he or she has been




("Civil effects of absolutely null marriage; putative marriage"). 135
Verneuile clearly illustrates, however, that the construction of fraud
pursuant to "mistake respecting the person"' 36 has received the same
narrow reading as error.
Despite this past interpretation and elimination of "mistake
respecting the person," the legislature is not prevented from
amending the present article concerning the vices of marital consent.
The recognition of fraud and error was once in force in Louisiana;
such availability can and should exist again.
IV. A PROPOSED REINTRODUCTION OF ERROR AND FRAUD AS
MARrrAL VICES OF CONSENT IN LOUISIANA
By analyzing the approach of general contract law to the vices of
error and fraud, as well as the approaches of other states in the
context of marriage, a proposal will be made for reintroducing these
vices into Louisiana's laws on marriage. Specifically, Louisiana
should recognize these vices when they pertain to the "essentials" of
the marriage contract. 137  In particular, the mutual duties of
marriage-fidelity, support, and assistance 38----should be protected
from the vices of error and fraud. 139 Though breach of these duties
may provide grounds for divorce to the other spouse, 140 such breach
should also be relevant to an annulment action.
135. La. Civ. Code art. 96 (cmt. (a) explains, "under certain circumstances a
person who has contracted a bigamous marriage in good faith will be deemed a
putative spouse even after he ceases to be in good faith.").
136. 438 So. 2d 615.
137. Twila L. Perry, The "Essentials of Marriage": Reconsidering the Duty
of Support and Services, 15 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1, 8 (2003) ("The law has
long embraced the idea that marriage involves certain essential elements and
duties.").
138. La. Civ. Code art. 98 provides, "Married persons owe each other
fidelity, support, and assistance."
139. Spaht, supra note 63, at 250-51 (provides a detailed explanation of each
of the noted duties).
140. Id. at 251. ("The consequences of a breach of the three obligations by a
spouse are to afford the other aggrieved spouse grounds for divorce, in the case
of a breach of the negative obligation of fidelity, and, in other cases, denial of
support because of fault on the part of the claimant spouse."); see La. Civ. Code
arts. 103 & 111.
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For example, this approach has been adopted by the state of
California.14 1  After surveying relevant case law from the state,
commentators have noted that those representations found to be
"essential" to the marital relationship are based on the articles of
California's Family Code. 142  As these statutes indicate, "the
Legislature considers procreation and familial support to be the
'very essence' of the marital relation." 143 Thus, annulment cases are
decided in accordance with these precepts.'4
Like California, Louisiana imposes three mutual duties upon the
parties to a marriage contract-fidelity, support, and assistance.
145
Yet, the only recognized vice, duress, does not provide a defensive
shield for these duties. Instead, duress seems protective of
"individual happiness, ' 146 not "procreation and familial support."'
147
Aimed only at bodily or reputational protection, 148 duress is ill-
suited to defend or preserve any of the three mutual duties of
marriage.
A. Assessment of Error as a Vice of Consent
141. See infra Part IV.B.3 for recognized grounds for annulment based on
fraud; John Walters, Does It Matter If Bubba Told a Lie? A Marital Dissolution
Hypothetical, 11 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 159, 161 (1999) (After noting the
recognized instances of annulment based on fraud, the author indicates that
"false representations about business ownership, chastity, and lazy, sloppy
drunkenness have been found insufficient to warrant annulment.").
142. Walters, supra note 141, at 162 (stating of the California Family Code,
"Little attention is paid there to the emotional or moral aspects of the marital
relationship, while considerable effort is devoted to property rights, children,
and support in relation to marriage."); see also Cal. Fam. Code § 720 (West
2004) (listing "mutual respect, fidelity, and support" as the marital obligations).
143. Walters, supra note 141, at 162.
144. Note that Delpit v. Young, 51 La. Ann. 923, 25 So. 547 (La. 1899),
would have been decided in the same manner in California as it was in
Louisiana, since false representation of chastity is not a sufficient ground for
annulment. See, e.g., Barnes v. Barnes, 42 P. 904 (Cal. 1895).
145. La. Civ. Code art. 98.
146. Spaht, supra note 63, at 261. In arguing for the recognition of more
mutual duties, the author opines that "by the withdrawal of law from the
regulation of marriage, couples believe that their marriage is a creation of their
own, intended for their individual happiness." Id.
147. Walters, supra note 141, at 162.
148. La. Civ. Code art. 93 cmt. (b) provides: "As used in this Article,
'duress' includes not only executed violence, but also threatened violence, if the
threat is pending at the time consent is given .... Threats to reputation or
fortune may be sufficient to invalidate a marriage under this Article."
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Not only is error a recognized vice of consent in the context of
general obligations in Louisiana, but many other jurisdictions also
list the vice as sufficient to nullify a marriage contract.
1. Louisiana's Approach with Regard to Obligations in General
In the context of conventional obligations, Louisiana Civil Code
article 1950 categorizes error in five ways.' 49 Error may bear on (1)
the nature of the contract; (2) the thing that is the contractual object,
or a substantial quality of that thing; (3) the person or the qualities of
the other party; (4) the law; or (5) any other circumstance that the
parties regarded, or should in good faith have regarded, as a cause of
the obligation. 15  Thus, the present code makes a "careful
enumeration of different categories of error, all of which are just
vices of consent and give rise to a nullity which is only relative. ' ' 1
In contrast to the present Civil Code's single article, the 1870
Code's section on error with regard to obligations in general
explicitliy recognized the various types of error in different
articles. In the 1870 Code, error was categorized in accordance
with the Roman classifications of error in negotio, in persona, in
corpore, and in substantia.153 Error in negotio entails a mistaken
view of the nature of the contract; basically, this is a mistake as to
the type of contract.15 4 Error in persona concerns the identity of the
party with whom the mistaken party contracts and leads to
nullification "[w]hen that person's identity was important to
consent."'155 Error in corpore involves mistaken identity of the
149. La. Civ. Code art. 1950.
150. See Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 64 (providing a detailed
explanation of each of these categories).
151. Id.atlo-11.
152. Par. 3- "Of Error, Its Divisions and Effects" (arts. 1820-1823); Par.
4--"Of Error in the Motive" (arts. 1824-1833); Par. 5---"Of Error as to the
Person" (arts. 1834-1840); Par. 6---"Of Error as to the Nature and Object of the
Contract" (arts. 1841-1845); Par. 7---"Of Errors of Law" (art. 1846).
153. David P. Doughty, Error Revisited: The Louisiana Revision of Error as
a Vice of Consent in Contracting, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 717, 725 (1988); see also
Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 52, at 46-47.
154. Doughty, supra note 153, at 718. ("The example cited in Justinian's
Digest describes a party who erroneously believes he is entering into a sale, but
instead makes a loan or a contract for hire.").
155. Id. at 719. The author explains:
Typically, an error in persona occurred when a party intended to
contract with a particular person for a task requiring a measure of skill
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contractual object.1 56 Finally, error in substantia involves error as to
determinant qualities15 7 or the substance of a thing.151 Article 1950
still reflects these traditional Roman categories.'
59
Louisiana's article concerning error as to the person was heavily
influenced by French law. 16° Under article 1110 of the French
Code, a broad, subjective approach has been adopted; thus,
nullification may result if the mistaken party was in error as to a
quality of the other contracting party, if that quality determined his
consent. 16 1 Though the article was revised in 1984,162 old Louisiana
Civil Code article 1834, under the category "Of Error as to the
Person," stated, "Error as to the person, with whom the contract is
made, will invalidate it, if the consideration of the person is the
principal or only cause of the contract, as it always is in the contract
of marriage.' 163 Louisiana law further recognized that "[e]rror as to
the quality or character in which the party acts, as well as a mistake
as to the person himself," would invalidate a contract if such was the
or expertise, but erroneously made the contract with another. To
prevent abuse of this rule, the Romans required that the other party's
skill or personal expertise be strongly connected with the object of the
agreement.
Id.
156. Id. Note that a mistaken accessory of a correctly identified object does
not lead to nullification. For example, error in corpore exists when a buyer
intends to buy a horse, but mistakenly purchases a mule; but, error as to the
horse's color is merely accessory and, as such, is insufficient.
157. Id. at 719 ("Generally, an error as to the quality of an object did not
affect the validity of the contract unless the quality of the thing differed greatly
from its 'distinct commercial category."').
158. Id. at 720. (As example, such an error exists in "the sale of a table
supposed to be solid silver but which was instead only silver-plated or made of a
different metal.").
159. See La. Civ. Code art. 1950; see also Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra
note 64; Doughty, supra note 153, at 721 ("The four Roman categories of error,
as well as the other concepts they established, continue to permeate the law of
obligations.").
160. Doughty, supra note 153, at 727.
161. Nicholas, supra note 46, at 91-92 ("Article 1110 Cc declares that
mistake as to the person with whom one intends to contract is not a cause of
nullity 'unless the consideration of this person is the principal cause of the
agreement."').
162. La. Civ. Code art. 1950, 1984 Act No. 331, § 1; see La. Civ. Code art.
1950 cmt. (a) (notes that the article "restates principles found in C.C. Arts.
1824-1846 (1870). It does not change the law .....
163. La. Civ. Code art. 1834 (1870).
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principal cause of the agreement. 64 However, though quality or
character may invalidate some contracts, 165 the Louisiana Supreme
Court has resisted extending this principle to marriage contracts,
holding that a mistake as to the character of a spouse is insufficient
to annul a marriage. 166  This judicial interpretation can not be
reconciled with the legislation. The explicit reference to "the
contract of marriage" in the article on "error as to the person"
seemed to mandate application of the article to these prior cases.
Yet, the court's disregard of this language helped establish the
narrow interpretation of "mistake respecting the person," which led
to its eventual elimination as a ground for annulling a marriage. 167
Though these general obligation articles should not be
indiscriminately extended to a marriage contract,168 these articles
provide several useful principles that should be explicitly recognized
in the context of annulments. Particularly, the importance placed
upon error as to the person and error as to the qualities of the person
are relevant considerations in the context of marriage, as the identity
and particular essential qualities of the spouse are surely the
"principal cause" of the marriage contract.
2. Recognition of Error as a Marital Vice in Other States
Several American jurisdictions recognize error as a sufficient
ground for annulment. For instance, Kansas lists among its grounds
for annulment "mistake of fact" and "lack of knowledge of a
material fact.' 169 Specifically, a marriage can be annulled "if the
parties would not have entered into the marriage contract had all the
164. La. Civ. Code art. 1838 (1870) ("Error as to quality or character in
which party acts-Illustration").
165. Doughty, supra note 153, at 727-28, 744 n.83 (citing Bischoff v.
Brothers of the Sacred Heart, 416 So.2d 348 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Ostrolenk
v. Louise S. McGehee School, 402 So.2d 237 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
404 So.2d 1259 (1981)).
166. Doughty, supra note 153, at 728, 744 n.85 (referencing Stier v. Price,
214 La. 394, 37 So. 2d 847 (1948) (denying annulment based on spouse's
concealed insanity) and Delpit v. Young, 51 La. Ann. 923, 931, 25 So. 547,
550).
167. The Louisiana Supreme Court makes no mention of article 1834 in
either Stier v. Price, 214 La. 394, 37 So. 2d 847, or Delpit v. Young, 51 La. Ann.
923, 25 So. 547.
168. See supra Part II.A.
169. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1602 ("Grounds for Annulment").
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facts been known."'170 There is no limitation that the error concern
solely the physical identity of the person.
In addition to express recognition of error, numerous states
implicitly acknowledge this vice in the context of marriage
contracts. 17 1  Impotence is a fertile ground for such implicit
recognition. 172 For instance, preceding its statute announcing
"Fraud, Duress or Force" as vices of consent of a marriage, Texas
statutorily recognizes impotence as a ground for annulment. 173 This
statute only requires that the afflicted party be permanently impotent
at the time of the marriage and that the other party not have then
known of his impotence. 174  No mention is made of fraudulent
misrepresentation or silence; mere lack of knowledge on the part of
the mistaken spouse is sufficient.
175
Impotence is a significant ground for annulment, as it so closely
relates to the traditionally held view of the purpose of
marriage--procreation. 176  In light of contemporary same-sex
170. Elrod & Buchele, supra note 125.
171. See infra Appendix: State Chart of Marital Vices.
172. See Borten, supra note 40, at 1098 ("[Mjost states permit annulment of
a marriage on the grounds of the incurable impotency of one party .... "); Foote,
supra note 38, at 103 ("Common statutory provisions include prohibitions of
marriages of persons who lack the physical capacity to consummate the
marriage by sexual intercourse.... ."); see also Kaufman v. Kaufman, 164 F.2d
519 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ("[T]he record contains in the testimony of the plaintiff
direct evidence of the defendant's impotence which... was amply sufficient to
require a judgment of annulment.").
173. See, e.g., V.T.C.A. Family Code § 6.106 (Texas-Impotency).
174. Id.
175. See, -e.g., Cofer v. Cofer, 287 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
(The plaintiff filed suit "upon the ground that appellee was incurably impotent at
the time of marriage and if mistaken in this then that fraud was practised [sic]
upon him in that appellant entered into the marriage with the intent never to
consummate it by cohabitation.").
176. See, e.g., William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United
States: A Review and Critique, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 961, 987 (2001) (The author
indicates that marriage is "particularly well suited to advance certain goals...
[which] include procreation (since a sexual relationship between a man and a
woman is the only context in which procreation can take place naturally) .... ");
Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New Millennium: Heterosexual, Same-Sex-
Or Not at All?, 34 Fam. L.Q. 271, 299 (2000) ("[T]he real purpose of giving
special legal status to marriage and family remains what it has always been: The
provision of our first-choice setting for the procreation and raising of
children."). Illustrating the historical importance of this purpose, see, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen 605, 610 ("[O]ne of the leading and most
important objects of the institution of marriage under our laws is the procreation
2006]
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marriage issues, this marital purpose has renewed importance. But,
Louisiana's failure to place any real worth upon impotence provides
same-sex marriage proponents with more leverage to argue that
marriage is not founded upon procreation, but, instead, is grounded
on individualistic ideals. 177
In recognizing impotence as a grounds for annulment,
limitations and conditions should be imposed. As other states have
required, the incapacity must have existed at the time of marriage,
1 78
been unknown to the other spouse at that time,179 and be incurable
and permanent.180 Moreover, the unaffected spouse can choose to
confirm the marriage by never petitioning for an annulment.
Therefore, within this narrow framework, the importance of
impotence would be recognized by the state, though such incapacity
would not prevent affected parties from ever marrying.
Despite the past restrictive reading of "error as to the person" in
the context of marriage contracts, there is no reason for its
elimination as a recognized vice of consent. Even if restricted to the
Delpit court's interpretation of error as to the physical identity of a
person, the availability for annulment based on error should exist.
Particularly, its possible application to a marriage involving a
transsexual renders the vice of error a timely addition to the present
article.1
8 1
of children, who shall with certainty be known by their parents as the pure
offspring of their union.").
177. See, e.g., Testimony of Experts in Family Law: Hearing on H. 3677, H.
1149, and S. 1045 Before the J. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2003 Leg. (Mass.
2003) (testimony of Professor Katharine Silbaugh, Professor Charles Kindregan,
and Monroe Inker, Esq.) (In dismissing the averment that "the primary purpose
of marriage is to support procreation," the speakers argue that "the primary
purpose of marriage--to support an enduring and committed union of two
persons who share sexual intimacy and economic resources-would be
furthered by the inclusion of same-sex couples within the institution of civil
marriage.").
178. See, e.g., Helen v. Thomas, 150 A.2d 833 (Del. 1959); Dolan v. Dolan,
259 A.2d 32 (Me. 1969); T v. M, 242 A.2d 670 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1968).
179. See, e.g., Helen v. Thomas, 150 A.2d 833; Rickards v. Rickards, 166
A.2d 425 (Del. 1960); Vanden Berg v. Vanden Berg, 197 N.Y.S. 641 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1923).
180. See, e.g., Dolan v. Dolan, 259 A.2d 32; Ferguson v. Ferguson, 415 P.2d
676 (Idaho 1966); Sarda v. Sarda, 153 A.2d 305 (D.C. 1959).
181. La. Civ. Code art. 93; see also Taitz, supra note 22, at 55 (1987) ("[A]
post-operative transsexual of either sex is absolutely incapable of procreation.").
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Ideally, however, error should not be limited merely to error as
to the physical identity of the person, but should be recognized in
accordance with Louisiana's enunciated marital duties.' 8
2
Particularly, the duty of fidelity must be protected from error
because of its connection to impotence. 183  By re-instituting this
ground for annulment of marriage, the Louisiana Legislature will
reiterate its adherence to the traditional concept of marriage.
B. Assessment of Fraud as a Vice of Consent
As with error, fraud is also a recognized vice of consent in
Louisiana's law of general obligations. Yet, unlike the majority of
other jurisdictions,' 84 the state does not consider it to be sufficient
grounds for nullifying a marriage contract.
1. Louisiana's Approach with Regard to Obligations in General
As defined in Louisiana Civil Code articles 1953 and 1955,
contractual fraud involves the inducement of a person into error
through misrepresentation or suppression of the truth, with the
intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for the inducer or to
cause a loss or inconvenience to the other party.185 In the context of
general obligations in Louisiana, fraud has been categorized
according to fraudulent actions and inactions. Fraudulent action can
182. La. Civ. Code art. 98.
183. See La. Civ. Code art. 98 cmt. b ("[T]he term fidelity refers not only to
the spouses' duty to refrain from adultery [the negative duty], but also to their
mutual obligation to submit to each other's reasonable and normal sexual desires
[the positive duty]."). Impotence seems to threaten both of these aspects of the
duty of fidelity. See also Borten, supra note 40, at 1127. Borten argues:
[T]he distinctiveness of marriage has historically been tied to the
presumption that it is first and foremost a sexual relationship, a
presumption enforceable by either party through the annulment action
as an "implied term" of the marital "contract." While it is the
procreative potential of sexual intercourse that was behind this
presumption, the case law suggests that the concern was not with
promoting procreation but rather with preventing it outside of the stable
marital relationship.
Id.
184. See infra Appendix: State Chart of Marital Vices.
185. La. Civ. Code arts. 1953, 1955.
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result from (1) scheme; 186 (2) false assertion; 187 (3) promissory
statements; 188 (4) impersonation; 189 (5) concealment;1 9  and (6)
misrepresentation of legal age.' 91 Fraudulent inaction, on the other
hand, can result from (1) silence; 192 (2) fraudulent reticence; 193 and
(3) duty to disclose with silence.'9 4 Of these noted instances, all
seem possible of application to a marital situation.
As to the duty to disclose, an important exception exists.
Ordinarily, fraud is not found if a party could have ascertained the
truth "without difficulty, inconvenience, or special skill. 195
However, when a relation of confidence exists between the parties,
so that one is inclined to rely on the judgment or statements of the
other, reliance upon the party's allegations is justified. 196 Louisiana
courts have held that such confidence "must exist in the relation
between spouses."' 97  Moreover, engaged couples are thought to
share such a "relation of confidence" to which the exception to the
186. Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 64, at 53 (explaining that this
results "when the creation of a false impression requires the concerted action, or
conspiracy, of two or more persons who indulge in the production of a sort of
dishonest playlet....").
187. Id. at 54 (equating this to a lie, which "is a simple form of scheme
designed to misrepresent a certain state of affairs, and that is, precisely the very
essence of fraud.").
188. Id. at 55 (noting that no distinction between present or past facts and
future facts is made with regard to these false assertions in the Louisiana Civil
Code).
189. Id. (explaining that this is a "false assertion of identity").
190. Id. at 55-56 (stating that, though involved in false assertion and scheme,
concealment may be present in non-verbal acts and may include no conspiracy).
191. Id. at 56 (noting that this ground is only recognized if the other party
reasonably relied upon a minor's misrepresentation of majority).
192. La. Civ. Code art. 1953 ("Fraud may also result from silence or
inaction"); see also Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 64, at 56-57 ('The
Code Napoleon makes no reference to silence as a means of committing fraud,
but the French doctrine and jurisprudence agree that a party may intentionally
induce another into an error through silence or inaction.").
193. Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 64, at 57-58.
194. Id. at 58-60 (noting that this duty to speak involves the notion of good
faith; but, it seems that "good faith does not demand that a party disclose
information that he can use to his advantage, provided he does not mislead the
other party.").
195. La. Civ. Code art. 1954.
196. Id.
197. Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, supra note 64, at 60 (referencing Hodson v.
Hodson, 292 So.2d 831 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974) and Holcomb v. Kincade, 406
So.2d 650 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981), writ denied, 410 So.2d 650 (1982)).
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duty to disclose should also apply. 198 Numerous other jurisdictions
have also recognized the confidential relationship shared by engaged
couples, noting that such individuals are not like buyers and sellers
who deal at arms' length. 199
Relatedly, Professor Katherine Shaw Spaht,2° the Reporter of
the Persons Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute who
helped draft the revisions and who has written numerous articles on
the topic of marriage, 20 1 asserts, "there is a potential ground for
annulment of a covenant marriage that may exist which does not
exist explicitly for a spouse who enters a 'standard' marriage:
fraud.' ,20 2 She bases this assertion upon the Declaration of Intent
that the parties to a covenant marriage must sign 203 and the
"confidential relationship" that exists between an engaged couple.204
Regardless of whether the couple is entering a covenant
marriage or a standard marriage, however, this relation of
confidence should be recognized in limited circumstances. Mere
dissatisfaction with certain personal qualities or beliefs should not
be privy to this exception; but, situations of grave fraud relating to
198. Spaht, supra note 32, at 130 n.168 ("Clearly, husbands and wives enjoy
a confidential relationship; therefore, an engaged couple should enjoy a
confidential relationship.").
199. See ,e.g., Levy v. Sherman, 43 A.2d 25 (Md. 1945); In re Malchow's
Estate, 172 N.W. 915 (Minn. 1919); Kline v. Kline, 57 Pa. 120 (1868); Pierce v.
Pierce, 71 N.Y. 154 (1877).
200. Jules F. and Frances L. Landry Professor of Law, Louisiana State
University Law Center.
201. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: Recapturing
the Meaning of Marriage, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1547, n.al (1998) ("The
author drafted the Louisiana Covenant Marriage law."); Spaht, supra note 24, at
1131 n.2 ("The Reporter for the Persons Committee of the Louisiana Law
Institute is the author of this article."). See, e.g., Spaht, supra note 32; Spaht,
supra note 63; Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years: The
Incredible Retreat of Law from the Regulation of Marriage, 63 La. L. Rev. 243
(2003).
202. Spaht, supra note 32, at 91. The author's statement serves to undermine
the assertion that fraud is recognized in a standard marriage by way of analogy
to general obligations rules.
203. Id. at 92 (Because the signing of the declaration "transforms a potential
'suppression of the truth' into a 'misrepresentation,"' it is argued that fraud
becomes a ground for annulling the covenant marriage.); La. R.S. 9:273.1
(2004) (stating that the parties to a covenant marriage must sign a Declaration of
Intent, in which they acknowledge that "[w]e have chosen each other carefully
and disclosed to one another everything which could adversely affect the
decision to enter this marriage.").
204. Id. at 93, n.168.
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the essentials of marriage must not be dismissed for lack of due
diligence. Some matters are so essential to the contract of marriage
that associated acts of fraud on the part of one of the parties must
not be tolerated.
2. Marital Torts Based on Fraud
Though outside of the realm of contracts, it is significant that
marital tort claims can be sustained based on fraud. Such an
action requires (1) a false representation made by the defendant; (2)
knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the statement is
false (though, in some states, reckless disregard or negligence will
suffice); (3) an intent to induce the plaintiff to rely on the
misrepresentation; (4) justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff;
and (5) damage to the plaintiff.20 6 Reflective of the most common
case,207 the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal allowed an
award of damages to be made to a putative spouse in Holcomb v.
Kincaid,20 8 based upon the husband's false representation that he
had legally divorced his first wife prior to his marriage to the
plaintiff.
In a recent case based on fraudulent inducement to marry, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court equated tortious fraud to annulment
fraud.209  However, commentators assert that "the 'fraudulent'
conduct which justifies an annulment is substantially less than that
which would be required for a tort. ' 21°  Based on the potential
economic interest involved, it is argued that tort claims should only
205. Robert G. Spector, Fraudulent Inducement Into Marriage: Still Tortious
After All These Years, 12 No.3 Fair Share 8, 8 (1992) (noting that "wrongfully
inducing a person into marriage may be tortious" and that "[tihe tort that is
usually relied on is fraud or misrepresentation").
206. Id. (referencing Prosser & Keeton, Torts, § 105 at 728 (5th ed., 1984)).
207. Robert G. Spector, Marital Torts: The Current Legal Landscape, 33
Fam. L.Q. 745, 756 (1999) ("Most of [the cases] concern the inducement of the
plaintiff into a sham marriage.").
208. 406 So.2d 650 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
209. Miller v. Miller, 956 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1998) (The court allowed the
plaintiff to proceed with his tort claim for fraudulent inducement into marriage
against his former wife and in-laws; they had previously misrepresented that the
plaintiff was the father of the child she was then carrying.).
210. Spector, supra note 207, at 756 ("Other than the situation where one
spouse is already married, the cause of action for fraudulent inducement into
marriage should be confined to those situations where the economic interests of
the plaintiff are invaded.").
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be permitted when there exists actual economic deprivation.211
Because this financial concern is not present in an annulment action,
less serious conduct is necessary. As such, Louisiana's recognition
of a tort action based on fraud merits allowance of annulments based
on fraud.
3. Recognition of Fraud as a Marital Vice in Other States
Fraud is recognized as a legitimate ground for annulling a
marriage in nearly every other jurisdiction. Though all states do
not explicitly categorize the types of fraud permitting annulment in
the same manner, the general rule is that the fraud must relate to
"the essentials of the marriage relation.' 213  Two differing
interpretations of the requisite fraud for annulments have emerged.
These competing opinions are exemplified by the court decisions
rendered in Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and California, on the one
hand, and those in New York, on the other.
Evidencing the more prevalent view, the courts of Wisconsin,
Massachusetts, and California strictly follow the "essentials"
doctrine.2 14  Under this doctrine, the plaintiff must prove the
existence of an intentional misrepresentation of an existing material
fact or facts which would mislead an ordinarily prudent person to
consent to and enter into the marriage. 2 15  While fraud is a
recognized vice to ordinary contracts, "It]he difference between
fraud in connection with an ordinary contract and fraud as a basis
211. Id.
212. See infra Appendix: State Chart of Marital Vices.
213. 52 Am.Jur.2d Marriage § 27 (2004); see, e.g., Wells v. Talham, 194
N.W. 36, 40 (Wis. 1923)
[Tihe degree of disappointment realized by a spouse on the discovery
of hidden and disagreeable facts in the past life of the other spouse can
hardly be the basis for annulling a marriage unless there has been fraud
going to the essentials and material elements on which the marriage
relation rests.
214. See, e.g., Wells, 194 N.W. 36; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen 605, 608
(Mass. 1862) ("Nothing can then avoid it [a marriage contract] which does not
amount to a fraud in the essentialia of the marriage relation."); In re Marriage of
Johnston, 18 Cal. App. 4th 499, 502 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) ("In California,
fraud must go to the very essence of the marital relation before it is sufficient for
an annulment.").
215. See, e.g., Lamberti v. Lamberti, 77 Cal. Rptr. 430, 432 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1969) ("[D]efendant's promises were a misrepresentation of a material fact
and were of such a nature as to deceive an ordinarily prudent person.").
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for annulment is, in a sense, merely a difference in the definition of
the term 'material."'' 216  Thus, in regards to annulments, the
fraudulent misrepresentation must be "essential" or "material" to the
marriage contract, 217 which necessitates a higher standard of
proof.248
The "essentials" doctrine was established in Massachusetts by
the state's Supreme Judicial Court in Reynolds v. Reynolds.219
Numerous other jurisdictions have proceeded to follow this
doctrine, as well. In its often-cited opinion,220 the Reynolds court
noted, while marriage is a civil contract, "it is not to be supposed
that every error or mistake into which a person may fall concerning
the character or qualities of a wife or husband, although
occasioned by disingenuous or even false statements or practices,
will afford sufficient reason for annulling an executed contract of
marriage." 221
Thus, "accidental qualities"222 do not constitute material or
essential elements of the marriage relationship and do not permit
annulment.
Presently, Massachusetts law recognizes several different types
of fraud which lead to an annulment. These include fraudulent
216. Robert Kingsley, Fraud as a Ground for Annulment of a Marriage, 18
S. Cal. L. Rev. 213, 213 (1944-1945) (According to the author, courts have
defined materiality in the objective sense as follows: "[D]id the
misrepresentation, in addition to being an inducement in fact, relate to facts
which the law deems of sufficient significance to merit interference with an
established status of public concern?").
217. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of L.A. v. Schaub, 162 P.2d 966, 971 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1945)
[I]t is well settled in this state, and in most other jurisdictions, that [the
types of fraud sufficient to annul a marriage] do not cover the broad
field of deceits that render voidable other types of contracts. The only
fraud which will support a proceeding for annulment of marriage is one
which goes to the essence of the marriage relation.
218. See, e.g., Heup v. Heup, 172 N.W.2d 334, 337 (Wis. 1969) ("[C]ourts
are hesitant to annul marriages on the ground of fraud unless clearly convinced
of the existence of the falsity of the representation and that the defrauded party
would not have entered into the marriage contract except for such false
representation.").
219. 3 Allen at 605.
220. See Kingsley, supra note 216, at 213.
221. Reynolds, 3 Allen at 607.
222. Id.
600 [Vol. 66
representations based on pregnancy, 223 impotence, 224 disease, 225 and
marrying for immigration status. Such reasons are reiterated by
the courts in California and include concealment of sterility,
2 27
existing pregnancy, 228 criminal history,229 intent not to have sexual
relations with the spouse,23 and the desire not to have children
despite promise to the contrary.
231
An "exceptional case"232 in California, which justified an
annulment of the marriage, was Schaub v. Schaub.233 The Schaub
court found that the young wife married her older husband with no
intention to fulfill the obligations of marriage.234 Instead, she had
previously conspired with her lover to marry the husband, never
consummate the marriage, and obtain the husband's real property by
having him execute deeds in joint tenancy.235  Emphasizing that
"[t]he only fraud which will support a proceeding for annulment of
223. Symonds v. Symonds, 432 N.E.2d 700, 703-04 (Mass. 1982) (the court
permitted annulment when a man married in reliance upon his wife's false
representation that she was carrying his child; pre-marital intercourse between
the parties did not serve as a defense to the annulment action). See Reynolds, 3
Allen at 610 (wife's misrepresentation to her husband that she was chaste, when,
in fact, she was then pregnant by another man was found to be "fraud of the
gravest character," and the court annulled the marriage).
224. See, e.g., Martin v. Otis, 124 N.E. 294, 296 (Mass. 1919) (impotency
concealed from spouse as grounds for annulment).
225. See Lisa J. Graff, Annulment, in Massachusetts Family Law Manual 31,
31.3d (Haskell A. Hassler & Mary H. Schmidt eds., MCLE 3d ed. 1996). Graff
argues:
This is determined on a case-by-case basis. The nature of the disease is
a relevant fact in that the courts appear more willing to annul a
marriage on the ground that a party fraudulently concealed a sexually
transmitted disease. It further depends on when the aggrieved party
learned and whether, with that knowledge, that party then affirmed the
marriage by cohabitation or consummation.
Id.
226. See, e.g., Damaskinos v. Damaskinos, 89 N.E.2d 766 (Mass. 1950)
(marriage was annulled when one party married solely to avoid deportation).
227. See, e.g., Vileta v. Vileta, 128 P.2d 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942).
228. See, e.g., Hardesty v. Hardesty, 223 P. 951 (Cal. 1924).
229. See, e.g., Douglass v. Douglass, 307 P.2d 674 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
230. See, e.g., Millar v. Millar, 167 P. 394 (Cal. 1917).
231. See, e.g., Maslow v. Maslow, 255 P.2d 65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).
232. First Nat'l Bank of L.A. v. Schaub, 162 P.2d 966, 972 (Cal. Ct. App.
1945).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 968 (The Defendant agreed with her lover to "falsely represent to




marriage is one which goes to the essence of the marriage
relation," 236 the court found that the wife's actions warranted an
annulment.
Though representing the more liberal interretation, New York
courts also adhere to the "essentials" doctrine. 237 Thus, the courts'
"broader view" of material fraud is still judged objectively. 238
Nevertheless, the court in Waft v. Waff39 asserted, "the fraud need
not necessarily concern what is commonly called the essentials of
the marriage relation;" 24° instead, it is sufficient that the fraud is
material, meaning that the defrauded party would not have
consented to the marriage had the fraud not been practiced. 242 Still,
the fraud must be sufficient to deceive a reasonably prudent
person. 243 Within the broad category of fraud, New York courts
recognize fraud obtained by concealment, as well as by
misrepresentation. Exemplifying New York's broad approach, the
state's supreme court annulled a marriage based on the husband's
false assertion that he would treat the plaintiff's children by a former
marriage as his own.244 His failure to contribute to a harmonious
household was deemed material to the marriage and justified an
annulment.2
45
Despite the varying degrees of recognition of fraud, it is telling
that nearly every other United States jurisdiction, as well as other
civil law jurisdictions,246 recognizes fraud as sufficient to annul a
marriage. Though every instance of fraud should not justify an
annulment, Louisiana should adopt the narrow "essentials" doctrine,
which is followed by most jurisdictions and exemplified in
236. Id. at 971.
237. Borten, supra note 40, at 1117-18.
238. Kingsley, supra note 216, at 214.
239. 71 N.Y.S.2d 775 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947).
240. Id. at 778 (These "essentials" were "the rights and duties connected with
cohabitation and consortium.").
241. Sophian v. VonLinde, 253 N.Y.S.2d 496 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964).
242. Schonfeld v. Schonfeld, 184 N.E. 60 (N.Y. 1933); Brazil v. Brazil, 651
N.Y.S.2d 721, 722 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
243. Kober v. Kober, 211 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1965); Brazil, 651 N.Y.S.2d at
722; DiLorenzo v. DiLorenzo, 67 N.E. 63, 65 (N.Y. 1903); Avnery v. Avnery,
375 N.Y.S.2d 888 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), appeal dismissed, 348 N.E.2d 915
(1976).
244. Waft, 71 N.Y.S.2d at 776-77.
245. Id. at 777.
246. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and California. For instance, should an
exceptional case like Schaub247 arise in Louisiana, the defrauded
spouse should have the option to annul the marriage.
The limited recognition of fraud as a marital vice of consent will
provide protection to the mutual marital duties, particularly the duty
of fidelity.24 8 Elevation of the breach of these duties above mere
grounds for divorce will stress the importance of "fidelity, support,
and assistance' 249 to the marital relationship, thereby strengthening
the institution of marriage. If the "essentials" doctrine is applied
with discretion, it will afford defrauded parties an adequate,
alternative remedy to dissolution of a marriage.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, annulments should be recognized in Louisiana as an
available option for the dissolution of a marriage procured by error
or fraud. However, it must be remembered that this is not an
advocation for a completely liberal acceptance of the three vices of
consent. Rather, while it is necessary that these vices be recognized
in the contract of marriage, there must be categorical limitations. If
recognition is confined to breach of the mutual duties of fidelity,
support, and assistance, annulments based on fraud and error will
ensure that the "essentials" of marriage remain protected.
Additionally, because these vices are only relative, 250 a marriage
entered into due to fraud or error can be confirmed. 25 1 This permits
easy preservation of such a marriage, should the parties desire to
continue their union. Further, judicial intervention is mandatory, as
the marriage remains valid until the non-consenting spouse brings a
247. First Nat'l Bank of L.A. v. Schaub, 162 P.2d 966, 972 (Cal. Ct. App.
1945); see supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
248. Both the positive duty of fidelity and the negative duty of fidelity will
benefit from this protection. See supra note 176.
249. La. Civ. Code art. 98.
250. La. Civ. Code art. 95 provides:
A marriage is relatively null when the consent of one of the parties to
marry is not freely given. Such a marriage may be declared null upon
application of the party whose consent was not free. The marriage may
not be declared null if that party confirmed the marriage after
recovering his liberty or regaining his discernment.
251. La. Civ. Code art. 95. In the article's 1988 revision, the broader term
"confirm" was substituted for "cohabit."
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direct action of nullity and the marriage is annulled by judicial
decree.
252
Though divorce remains an option for terminating a marriage, an
annulment provides a legitimate alternative for a deceived or
mistaken spouse. Because an annulment declares that the marriage
was invalid from its inception,253 this option should be used
sparingly. But, the availability of annulment should exist for a
spouse who has been gravely mistaken or defrauded. By re-
instituting the vices of error and fraud, the legislature will reiterate
its commitment to the institution of marriage and will preserve the
serious, sacred nature of marriage.
Emily Latham*
252. La. Civ. Code art. 97 cmt. provides: "In Louisiana the relatively null
marriage has long been regarded as valid until annulled by a judicial decree
rendered in a direct action of nullity brought by a proper party . see also
La. Civ. Code art. 95.
253. See supra Part II.B.3.
* I would like to thank Professor Andrea Carroll for her invaluable and
expert assistance, as well as my parents, Susan and Kenneth Latham, and fiance,
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* Statute or case law includes a reference to "Impotency" as a
ground for annulment.
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